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The principal epic matter of the Orlando innamorato begins with the council of African kings in Biserta that opens Book 2. After King Agramante has announced his ambitious plan to invade France, the other kings respond. Branzardo, held to be the most prudent ("il piu prudente," 01 2.1.38) of all those gathered at Biserta, is the first to speak.2 Turning a problem of action (whether or not to invade France) into a question of knowledge, he states that there are three ways to arrive at knowledge of all things -reason, example, and experience: The statement takes on the aspect of a lesson when Branzardo goes on to illustrate each of these three ways in three distinct stanzas. His three pathways of knowledge, moreover, all lead to the same conclusion -that the proposed invasion of France would end in failure. King Sobrino next speaks up to support Branzardo's argument based on experience, since he has fought the same Christian knights during the invasion of France led by Agramante's grandfather ("io gli ho provati," OI 2.1.51).3 The fact that Boiardo singles out Branzardo as a figure of wisdom ("ha molto sapere," OI 2.1.44) suggests a close alliance between prudence and wisdom as the virtues that permit us to foresee the probable outcome of our actions and therefore help us to make the right choices. 4 Boiardo's fictional alliance between wisdom and prudence recalls the moral philosophy of Aristotle which, along with the writings of Cicero and Seneca, helped shape the idea of wisdom in fifteenth century civic humanism. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle related wisdom to prudence, which he defined as "something more than a knowledge of general principles," to become rather "a matter of conduct" (180).5 In his study of the Renaissance idea of wisdom, Eugene Rice examines the humanists' understanding of wisdom as an active, not contemplative virtue, as an ethical precept rather than a body of knowledge (149). Regarding Coluccio Salutati, Rice remarks that "the only reason he does not say that prudence is nobler than wisdom is that he is prepared to take a further step and, by defining wisdom as moral philosophy, identify the two" (36).6
The arrogant Rodamonte begins his refutation of the two previous interventions with recourse to a "truth" based on scientific observation: "In ciascun loco / Ove fiamma s'accende, un tempo dura / piccola prima, e poi si fa gran foco; / ma come viene al fin, sempre se oscura, / mancando del suo lume a poco a poco" (OI 2.1.53). This scientific fact is the basis of an analogy that describes human nature: "E cosi fa l'umana creatura, / che, poi che la di sua eth passato il verde, / la vista, il senno e Yanimo si perde" (OI2.1.53). Using facts about the world of nature in order to explain human behavior was common practice at least as far back as Aristotle, and was based on the understanding of correspondences between man (the microcosm) and the greater world around him (the macrocosm). The particular example that Rodamonte provides, moreover, deals with the concepts of light and vision. He measures the flame by the light (lume) that it provides and by its darkening (se oscura). On the human front, the listing of sight (vista), sense/wisdom (senno) and courage/spirit (animo), suggests a chronological sequence: sight leads to knowledge which then governs action. The primacy of sight in Rodamonte'~s analogy continues as he applies his universal statement regarding humankind to the circumstances at hand: "Questo ben chiar si vede nel presente / per questi duo che adesso hanno parlato" (012.1.54). Rodamonte is adept at applying scientific knowledge to human nature and at moving from the universal to the particular, and his emphasis on sight is a cue that for him the underlying basis of all knowledge is sense-perception. Indeed, as I argue below, Rodamonte will later state that his own knowledge of the world is based on what he can see with his eyes. One could thus say that Rodamonte counters the moral philosophical tradition with scientific observation of natural phenomena and human nature, replacing "experience, example, and reason" with "sight" as the privileged mode of knowledge acquisition. However, despite Rodamonte's recourse to the rigors of science, the limits of sense-perception for gaining knowledge were pointed out at least as far back as Plato's Theaetetus, in which Socrates criticized those "who believe in nothing but what they can grasp in their hands, and who will not allow that actions or generation or anything invisible can have real existence."7
The King of Garamanta intervenes next to suggest another way of arriving at knowledge -divine revelation. A prophet of the Muslim divinity Apollino, the King of Garamanta is described as a "saggio [...] incantatore, astrologo e indovino" (OI 2.1.57). Whereas Branzardo and Sobrino sought knowledge through moral philosophy, and Rodamonte sought knowledge through earth science, the King of Garamanta seeks knowledge through metaphysics, and we are told that he spends his time counting the stars and measuring the heavens. Divine revelation leads him to the same conclusion that the other two kings had arrived at through prudence and wisdom, and he goes beyond their vision by adding a detail that the others could not have foreseen: "E Rodamonte con sua gran possanza / Diverra pasto de' corbi de Franza" (OI 2.1.59). If Rodamonte dismissed prudence and wisdom, one can well imagine how he responds to prophecy. He declares that he will be his own prophet in France ("io sero il profeta di quel loco," OI 2.1.61), thus asserting his unlimited faith in his ability to fashion his own destiny.
Although the subject is ostensibly about a proposed war in France, the three-way discussion suggests a battle pitting prudence, wisdom, and divine revelation against sensory perception. In addition, the kings' wider knowledge of the past, the world, and the heavens, is contrasted with Rodamonte's declared knowledge of his own strength. Their differing conceptions of knowledge acquisition lead them to make opposite assessments about the outcome of an African invasion of France: while the three kings predict disaster, Rodamonte expects victory. Boiardo had already indicated that Biserta would be destroyed in the upcoming war (2.1.19), thus confirming in advance that the kings were correct.
One could also place these pathways of knowledge in a hierarchical relationship. Aristotle postulated that knowledge originates -but does not end -with sense-perception, and mainstream medieval and Renaissance philosophers commonly reiterated that view. In his speculative works, the philosopher and theologian Nicholas Cusano (1401-1464) outlined a trajectory of knowledge acquisition which moved from sense-perception to the higher faculties of reason and intellect.8 Yet Cusano believed that even knowledge attained by discursive reason was no more than an approximation or a conjecture, and, especially in the quest to know God, the intellect needed to be supplemented with religious faith. In this context, one could say that Rodamonte is stuck on the first rung of the ladder of knowledge, while Branzardo, Sobrino and the King of Garamanta symbolize the successive stages.
King Agramante, characterized by pride, arrogance, and ambition, intervenes to tell the gathering of kings that they must accompany him to France. He does not, however, rely excusively on sense-perception the way that Rodamonte does. When the King of Garamanta reveals that a young man who could bring down Charlemagne is hidden out of sight in the mountains, Agramante believes his words ("ben crede a sue parole") and decides to delay the invasion until the youth is found. Boiardo endorses Agramante's decision by confirming the King of Garamanta's past success: "E sempre nel passato avea veduto / 1n corso delle stelle tutte quante, / E sempre avanti il tempo predicia / Divizia, guerra, pace, carestia" (OI 2.1.76). Here the King of Garamanta is not only predicting the future (the outcome of the war), but he is also affirming the existence of something (or, in this case, someone) not yet verified by sensory perception. The search could thus be seen as a contest between the King of Garamanta's and Rodamonte's opposing theories of knowledge acquisition.
The subsequent failure of the search for the youth, Rugiero, leads to a discussion that centers once again on the problem of knowledge. King Mulabuferso, sent to find Rugiero on Mount Carena, affirms and swears that Rugiero is not there simply because he has not seen him: This is not man fashioned in the image of God, but man as a god unto himself. He is the center of a universe that revolves around him. After hearing Rodamonte's reductionist view of reality, the King of Garamanta reaffirms his ability to discern and convey truth ("il vero"), a truth which for him includes the existence of God. He attributes Rodamonte's attitude precisely to a faulty manner of seeing, and his answer plays with the notion of sight: "Come vedeti, egli ha il viso perduto / Benche mai tutto non l'avesse intiero" (OI 2.3.25). As Bruscagli notes, il viso refers to la vista or, in this case, discernment, thus referring to Rodamonte's inability to see with the mind's eye (vol. 2: 574). At the same time, by prefacing his remark to Agramante with "come vedeti," the King of Garamanta calls on Agramante to share his mode of seeing in opposition to Rodamonte's impaired vision. Agramante once again sides with the King of Garamanta against Rodamonte, and decides to continue searching for Rugiero. Rodamonte, by contrast, refuses to wait any longer and immediately crosses the sea to France. Although he considered himself his own god, he is powerless against the forces of fortune, and a storm at sea leads to the loss of two thirds of his men before he even steps ashore onto French territory.
Once Rodamonte comes into contact with the world outside Africa, he begins to reassess his knowledge of his place in it.9 A preliminary step in Rodamonte's road to greater knowledge is his battle against Ranaldo. After experiencing first-hand Ranaldo's valor on the battlefield, Rodamonte declares that King Sobrino had indeed spoken the truth: "Come diceva il vero il re Sobrino!" (01 2.15.30). Rodamonte's "Io l'ho provato" (OI 2.15.29) is a direct echo of Sobrino's earlier "Io gli ho provati" (OI 2.1.51). Rodamonte, in fact, is so impressed by the truth of Sobrino's statement that he goes from one extreme to the other -whereas before he said that one should never believe another's experience, now he decares that one should always believe it: "Sempre creder si debbe a chi ha provato" (OI 2.15.30). As Rodamonte accepts this new way of learning about the world around him, he can also more accurately see himself in relation to others. His encounter with Ranaldo thus leads him to correct his perception of himself: "Io, che tutti pigliarli avea arroganza, / Assai ne ho de uno, e piu che di bastanza" (01 2.15.30).
The full transformation of Rodamonte's character comes about when he confronts Rugiero. Although Rodamonte does not find out his opponent's identity, Rugiero will change his way of seeing and his way of acting. First, Rugiero courteously takes the Christian Bradamante's place against Rodamonte when his fellow Saracen refuses to give her leave to follow the retreating Charlemagne. Then, when in the course of their battle Rodamonte loses his sword, Rugiero courteously waits for him to retrieve it rather than take advantage of the situation. Significantly, Rodamonte expresses his new evaluation of his opponent in terms of seeing: "Ben chiaramente aggio veduto / Che cavallier non e di te migliore" (OI 3.5.12). Ironically it is Rugiero, whose existence he doubted and whose importance to the invasion he dismissed, who provides Rodamonte with greater knowledge of the world and of his (smaller) place in it. It is this knowledge that leads Rodamonte to humble himself and declare unconditional obedience to Rugiero: "E sempre, quanto io possa e quanto io vaglia, / Di me fa il tuo parere in ogni banda, / Come il maggiore al suo minor comanda" (OI 3.5.13). These declarations of Rugiero's excellence and his own attitude of subservience show how his increased knowledge of the world is linked to a new way of acting. Rodamonte still thinks in extremes: the best knight he has encountered becomes the best knight tout court, and his readiness to obey is expressed with the absolutes "in ogni banda" and "sermpre." Perhaps this tendency to drastic shifts in thinking, also reflected in his reassessment of Sobrino's warning in light of his encounter with Ranaldo, characterizes Rodamonte as someone who is just beginning to learn to think differently and therefore lacks subtleties. At the same time, however, Boiardo makes dear that Rodamonte's new estimation, while extreme, is absolutely correct. The very first verse Boiardo wrote of Rugiero had said as much: "fu d'ogni virtute il pii perfetto / Di qualunque altro che al mondo si vanta" (OI 1.29.56). Rodamonte's total reversal in thinking is accompanied by an equally complete turnabout in his behavior: his arrogance has been transformed into humility. Rodamonte's itinerary of self-knowledge can be understood as a paideia, an education of the soul.l0 Although the poem is interrupted before Rodamonte encounters Rugiero again and can act on his declared intentions, one could expect that the future relation between the two knights would have continued to attest to the positive effects of both Rugiero's courtesy and Rodamonte's greater self-knowledge. Charles Ross has argued that John Milton saw Rugiero as a Christ figure (385) . Perhaps Rodamonte's meeting with Rugiero suggests something to that effect as well; whereas his battle against Ranaldo confirmed the rational teaching of Branzardo and Sobrino, his encounter with Rugiero harkens back to the supranatural knowledge of the King of Garamanta.
Ariosto's treatment of Rodomonte completely reverses the problem as presented by Boiardo with regards to both the acquisition of knowledge and the relation of knowledge to action. Whereas at his first appearance in the Innamorato Rodamonte did not believe anything he could not see with his own eyes, in the Furioso Rodomonte becomes the very picture of credulity. Moreover, whereas Boiardo's character would eventually profit morally when confionted by a reality that disproved his views and deflated his ego, in the Furioso, knowledge proves to be the corresponding character's undoing. Rodomonte's first error is to believe that Doralice will remain enamored of him while he spends all his time away at war. Rodomonte finds his assumption to have been misguided when Doralice chooses Mandricardo over him as her beloved. Crushed by this unwelcome reality, Rodomonte continues to think in absolutes and declares that all women are false and fickle. While this is presented as a case of disbelief (that is, he doubts the sincerity and fidelity of any woman), it is actually a case of proclaiming to have knowledge about all women without verifying his hypothesis. A single instance is sufficient to convince him that female fraud is infinite ("che de l'ascose / feminil frode sia copia infinita"). His reasoning ("or ragionando"), as the narrator comments, is without reason ("da ragion si dipartiva," 27.122; "di ragion passava il segno," 27.125).
At the council in Biserta in Innamorato 2.1, Branzardo had outlined the procedure of arriving at knowledge through reason, experience, and example. The experience and "reasoning" that has led to Rodomonte's erroneous view of women will soon find corraboration in the example of others. After abandoning Agramante, Rodamonte stops at an inn where the owner relates a misogynist tale about unfaithful women. The story of Giocondo and King Astolfo, which tells of the infidelity of every woman the two men encounter, is said to be one of the stories told to the innkeeper by Gian Francesco Valerio, an actual historical figure, who himself had knowledge ("sapea") of female fraud through both example and experience ("modeme istorie e antiche, / e proprie esperienze," OF 27.138). The innkeeper charges those who do not share his view to be "senza ragione" (OF 27.137) and contrasts his knowledge ("io so") with their "falsa opinione" (OF 27.135). Rodomonte believes the stories because they correspond to his emotion of anger after his "beloved" Doralice publicly declares her preference for Mandricardo. As he says to the innkeeper: "Che puoi tu farmi, / che piii al presente mi diletti e piaccia, / che dirmi istoria e qualche esempio darmi / che con l'opinion mia si confaccia?" (OF 27.140). Rodomonte had arrived at the inn imitating the wandering of the unrequited Petrarchan lover ("Di pensiero in pensiero ando vagando," OF 27.133), but he seems unaware of Petrarch's warning against judgments based on emotion: "Nothing is easier than to persuade people who want to be persuaded and already believe" (73). The same warning, however, is voiced by an elderly man at the inn who, stating that we hear many things that are not true ("assai cose udimo dire / che veritade in se non hanno alcuna," OF 28.76), maintains that anger ("ira," OF 28.78) had motivated Valerio, whose tales were based more on "opinione" than on "esperienza" (OF 28.77). Ariosto tells us that this honest and just old man had "piiu retta / opinion degli altri" (OF 28.76), an expression that on the one hand acknowledges all general views to be opinion without reaching the status of true knowledge, and on the other recognizes that some views are decidedly more correct than others. Following the old man's reasoning ("appresso alle ragioni," OF 28.84), he wants to provide examples to support his argument, thus reminding the reader that reason, experience, and example may support two contradictory truths and thus are no simple guarantee of trustworthiness. Rodomonte, however, refuses to even listen to examples that do not correspond to his own feelings. He is not interested in learning the truth or in acquiring greater knowledge, but only in hearing what will confirm the view he already holds. The problem that Ariosto is outlining here is the intrusive role of the emotions that prevents him from seeking the truth ("fuggia udire il vero," OF 28.84). Emotions prevent Rodomonte from gathering additional information that could lead to a more balanced judgment. Knowledge for Valerio, the innkeeper, and Rodomonte has thus been reduced to emotion-based opinion. Experience and example, in this Furioso episode, do not lead to greater knowledge, but only serve to support false beliefs.
Rodomonte's "knowledge" that all women are unfaithful is eventually belied by a new experience. When Rodomonte meets Isabella and wants to win her love, he shows his own fickleness by forgetting his previous disdain for women. Ariosto focuses on the problem of knowledge and truth throughout this episode. When Rodomonte hurls the hermit accompanying the bereaved Isabella into the air, the narrator caims not to know what became of him ("Che n'avenisse, ne dico ne sollo"). He then goes on to tell three different versions of the hermit's fall, concluding: "Di queste, qual si vuol, la vera sia: / di lui non parla pii l'istoria mia" (OF 29.7). By following an acknowledgment of the narrator's limited knowledge with a proliferation of possible stories, Ariosto suggests the human propensity to substitute knowledge with imagination, leading the reader to doubt the veracity of any history.
Rodomonte's next error combines unfounded belief with the need to verify "truth" through tangible evidence. Isabella tells Rodomonte about a magic potion that will make him invulnerable. Paradoxically, however, the proof of the potion's efficiency already presupposes belief in magic, since it requires taking an axe to Isabella's neck. Her explanation to Rodomonte focuses specifically on knowledge and belief: In the context of the first novella, Rinaldo is given the chance to gain knowledge about his wife's chastity or infidelity by drinking from a magic chalice.14 His host vividly underlines the separation between knowledge and belief in the following two verses: " Se vuoi saper se la tua sia pudica / (come io credo che credi, e creder d6i)" (OF 42.102). Rinaldo, however, realizes that this knowledge can be dangerous: "quanto fosse periglioso il caso / a porvi i labri, col pensier discorse" (OF 42.104). He therefore refuses to drink from the chalice, preferring "belief" over certain knowledge of his wife's chastity. Rinaldo states his reply in terms of accepting human limitations: "Non so s'in questo io mi sia saggio o stolto / ma non vo' piii saper, che mi convegna" (OF 43.7). Further expanding his reasoning, he has recourse to no less than the tree of knowledge in Genesis: "che tal certezza ha Dio piu proibita / ch'al primo padre l'arbor de la vita" (OF 43.7). Knowledge is thus equated with transgression. Rinaldo's new aversion to knowledge thus leads him to equate willful ignorance of his wife's possible infidelity with the bliss of the garden of Eden, as though dosing his eyes to reality could allow him to create his own terrestrial paradise.15 Indeed, rather than "love of wisdom," Rinaldo is advocating a "love of ignorance," and thereby preserving his own mental well-being.
The novellistic "example" about adultery that follows the proposed test seems to confirm the sagacity of Rinaldo's refusal, since the moral that Rinaldo draws from it is the inevitability of corruption and thus the need to avoid putting one's virtue to the test. The host tells how he had actually led his wife to adultery by testing her virtue. Rinaldo's response to the story is to question the host's own steadfastness: "Se te 
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